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This article examines the circulation and articulation of fascist ideas and practices 
among the so-called cooperating nationalist party Partai Indonesia Raya (Parindra) 
and its youth wing Surya Wirawan in late colonial Indonesia. After the radical nation-
alist parties demanding Indonesian independence had been crushed by the Dutch 
 colonial government in 1934, only parties refraining from making such radical de-
mands could operate in public. Since their frustratingly weak bargaining position in 
the political arena was hard to conceal, leading Parindra politicians such as Soeto-
mo (1888–1938) evoked powerful images of a ‘glorious Indonesia’ (Indonesia Moelia) 
to keep the  nationalist project alive. The ideas of Soetomo, who was an expressed 
 admirer of Mussolini, Hitler, and Japanese imperialism, had a considerable impact 
on Parindra’s political course. Others, such as the journalist Soedarjo Tjokrosisworo 
were particularly vocal about their fascist sympathies. Tjokrosisworo played an influ-
ential role in modelling the ‘scout group’ on the example of fascist fighting squads and 
other paramilitary units. The article argues that Parindra’s philofascist demeanor was 
an integral part of a strategy to achieve an aura of power. However, the party’s dyna-
mism and glory was just ‘staged’ to compensate for Parindra’s lacking scope of political 
 action. Generally, the party’s incorporation of fascist elements raises important ques-
tions about the relationship between anticolonial nationalism and fascism since the 
latter entered  Indonesia during a time when the nationalist project was still very much 
in the making.
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On 21 April 1933, shortly after Hitler’s successful seizure of power in Germany, 
an anonymous author with the pen name Marhaen Melarat (loosely translated: 
impoverished common man) published an article entitled ‘The Independence 
Movement and the Current of Fascism’ in which he concluded:
There were events in the [recent] past during which the Peoples’ Move-
ment faced a number of obstacles caused by various reactions which did 
not differ [from obstacles communists encountered in European coun-
tries]. Said obstacles were caused by the inclusion of suggestions from 
fascist circles. Among the people of Indonesia, the current of fascism has 
started to spread as well, and when it spreads unseen, it can also become 
dangerous for the Marhaen class.1
This early sensitivity for fascism was widespread among Indonesians with 
socialist leanings, for they were painfully aware of fascism’s potential to 
absorb the populist appeal of their movement into an aggressive form of 
ultra-nationalism.
Fascism’s ultimate inability to take deep roots in late colonial Indonesian 
society can appear ‘self-evident’ in hindsight, especially vis-à-vis the boom-
ing success of communist ideas. After Indonesia’s ‘national awakening’ took 
ground in the 1910s, Indonesian nationalism in the 1920s was spearheaded by 
the openly anticolonial Partai Komunis Indonesia [pki; Indonesian Communist 
Party] until that party was crushed by the Dutch colonial authorities in 1927–28. 
In the same turbulent year, Sukarno, who was to become Indonesia’s first 
President after the proclamation of independence in 1945, founded the Partai 
 Nasional Indonesia [pni; Indonesian National Party]. Known for his  charisma 
and his fiery oratory, he posed a great threat to Dutch colonial rule in the Indo-
nesian archipelago, as his movement gained momentum on an  unprecedented 
scale. Hence, he was finally arrested in 1929, only to be  released from prison 
and then rearrested in 1933, when he was finally sent into internal exile first 
in Flores and then in Bengkulu (Southwest Sumatra). Sukarno’s ideas drew 
heavily from Marxist thought, and he synthesized them into an eclectic ideol-
ogy often named Marhaenism, an eponym inspired by the alleged encounter 
 between Sukarno and a Javanese peasant called Marhaen.2 In his speeches and 
1 Fikiran Ra’jat 41–42, April 21, 1933, 11.
2 A detailed anglophone analysis of Marhaenism has not been written yet, despite the concept’s 
prominence in Indonesian political debates. Originally a Sundanese word meaning ‘small 
farmer’, the word was popularized by the Islamic organization Sarekat Islam in the 1910s and 
early 1920s. In the late 1920s, Sukarno adopted the word as an important  component of his 
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publications, Sukarno relentlessly promoted this neologism meant to describe 
the common Indonesian man of humble origins, as can be seen in the open-
ing quote taken from Fikiran Ra’jat [People’s Thought], a journal he published 
throughout the year 1933 until he was sent into exile. Even when Sukarno’s 
ideas were forced to go ‘underground,’ as the colonial authorities drastically 
tightened their grip on the nationalist movement, concepts borrowed from 
communism remained a mainstay of Indonesian nationalist thought until 
the colony was finally occupied by the Japanese in March 1942. Why was this 
 socialist influence so visible in the historiography on Indonesia, while fascism 
barely makes an appearance?
As Robert Cribb put it, merely promoting ‘the revitalisation of traditional 
Indonesian political forms was too unspecific a goal to form a significant part 
of the nationalist critique of colonial rule; Indonesia could have no Phan Boi 
Chao [an important pioneer of Vietnamese nationalism], no Meiji Emperor. 
The Marxist critique, by contrast, was not only powerful but unambiguously 
modern.’3 However, as I shall show during the course of my argument, fascism’s 
promise of a flawless synthesis between ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’ found 
 influential admirers in Indonesia, and socialists, as well as communists, were 
among the first to detect that influence. In fact, their own struggle for a united 
and communist Indonesia forced them to adapt their modernist message to 
‘local cultural and social imperatives,’ too.4 Hence, the allure of fascism can 
and should be placed alongside communism, Islamic modernism, moderate 
nationalism and many other political paths as part of a – so far neglected – 
critical engagement by Indonesians with Western views on societal issues and 
nationhood.5 In short: Anticolonial nationalism took on many forms, and it is 
only in hindsight that we can say that fascism, at least in the sense of an or-
ganized mass movement, was just a ‘flash in the pan’. Yet, as Frederick  Cooper 
succinctly put it while discussing potential flaws in historical writing, it is 
own, distinct nationalist vocabulary. On the genesis and role of Marhaenism under Sukarno, 
see John Ingleson, Road to Exile: The Indonesian Nationalist Movement 1927–1934 (Singapore: 
Heinemann Educational Books, 1979), 190–192; for a more detailed study of Marheanism’s 
roots in Marxism and socialism, I refer to Ign. Gatut Saksono, Marhaenisme Bung Karno: 
Marxisme ala Indonesia (Yogyakarta: Rumah Belajar Yabinkas, 2007).
3 Robert Cribb, ‘The Indonesian Marxist Tradition,’ in Marxism in Asia, ed. Colin Mackerras 
and Nick Knight (Kent: Croom Helm, 1985), 257.
4 R.E. Elson, ‘Indonesia and the West: An Ambivalent, Misunderstood Engagement,’ Australian 
Journal of Politics and History 52, no. 2 (2006): 264.
5 Elson, ‘Indonesia and the West,’ 264.
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 crucial to look at ‘what one does not see: the paths not taken, the dead ends of 
historical processes, the alternatives that appeared to people in their times.’6
I argue that fascism was seriously contemplated as such an ‘alternative’ by 
 Indonesian nationalists whose sympathies did not lie with socialism. That 
 being said, fascism was more of a practical than an intellectual influence, a 
point that has been entirely missed in studies of illiberal and authoritar-
ian trends in Indonesia. David Bourchier, whose recent publication Illiberal 
 Democracy in Indonesia made a valuable contribution to debates about the 
historical roots of the ideology of the ‘family state’ in Indonesia, remarks that 
it is hard to gauge ‘[h]ow far conservative Indonesian nationalist thought was 
influenced by more explicitly fascist or National Socialist ideologies.’7 From the 
viewpoint of intellectual history, this remark certainly holds true, since a cohe-
sive body of thought based on fascist references never emerged in Indonesia. 
However, ‘nationalist thought’ goes well beyond intellectual constructions of 
culture, race, or ideals of statehood. Fundamental elements such as organi-
zational principles (e.g., the fascist ideal of the ‘cadre’ or ‘squad’) and sets of 
 values (e.g., militarism) are essential building blocks of any political move-
ment, and it is in this realm of performative politics and mass-mobilization 
that historians can detect a strong fascist imprint. Intellectual history alone 
will not get us very far in this department. In this article, I look at the history of 
Partai Indonesia Raya [Parindra; Great Indonesia Party], one of the largest In-
donesian political parties in the late 1930s, asking the following question: what 
did anticolonial nationalism in Indonesia during the late 1930s and early 1940s 
do with fascism? And what did fascism do with ‘mainstream’ nationalism?
The room for maneuver was claustrophobic as far as hands-on political 
action was concerned. I argue that Parindra’s obsession with cadre-forming, 
unity, and glory was as much a preparation for better times as it was a compen-
sation mechanism to push through this period of hardship. The creed guiding 
Parindra’s development can be summarized with the popular slogan ‘fake it till 
you make it,’ and the national glory advocated by leading Parindra politicians 
referred both to a means (the performance of glory based on fascist ideals) and 
an end – a ‘glorious Indonesia’ (Indonesia Moelia). As this article attempts to 
show, fascism was a key influence in this process of ‘staging glory.’
6 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2005), 18.
7 David Bourchier, Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State (London: 
Routledge, 2015), 31.
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 Fascism in Indonesia: Approaching a Lacuna
Apart from a single Indonesian publication entitled Orang dan Partai Nazi 
di Indonesia [Nazis and Nazi Parties in Indonesia], dealing – although only 
in part – with fascist tendencies in late colonial Indonesia,8 historians have 
consistently ignored the question whether there was any profound interplay 
between fascism and certain strands of anticolonial nationalism. While the 
aforementioned monograph was unquestionably a breath of fresh air pointing 
out a  domain for further research, it did not attempt a systematic analysis of 
fascist influences. Focusing too much on the isolated case of a self-proclaimed 
‘fascist party’ in 1933 that barely outlasted its own announcement in the Dutch 
and Indonesian press, the author does not investigate other, more striking 
‘oddities’ he encountered during his research, such as the use of the Nazi sa-
lute among the youth organization of Parindra. This is particularly puzzling 
since he uses a photo of such a salute scene as the cover of his book. Yet, not a 
single paragraph is dedicated to an analysis of this youth organization and the 
question whether this salute was just a one-time event, or the performative 
manifestation of ideas that had a solid footing among the party’s membership.
I can only speculate on the reasons why fascism, both as a term and a con-
cept, has been widely avoided in debates about nationalism in Indonesia 
 despite the fact that scholars like Susan Abeyasekere, who has written the most 
important study of Parindra up to this day, looked at a part of the  relevant 
source material as early as the 1960s and 1970s.9 While she never mentions 
the Nazi salute used by Parindra’s youth organization or the expressions of 
 sympathy for the Axis powers among the party’s upper echelons, the sources 
she quotes indicate that she must have looked at some of the material this 
article is based on. I suspect that ‘fascism’, both as a term and a concept, had 
no established use for the investigation of anticolonial nationalist movements 
during the time Abeyasekere published her work on Parindra.
As matters stand now, fascism in Indonesia is usually associated with the 
Indonesian branch of the Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging [nsb; National 
 Socialist Movement], whose entire membership was either Dutch or of mixed 
8 Wilson, Orang dan Partai Nazi di Indonesia: Kaum Pergerakan Menyambut Fasisme (Depok: 
Komunitas Bambu, 2008).
9 Susan Abeyasekere, Relations between the Indonesian Cooperating Nationalists and the Dutch, 
1935–1942 (PhD diss., University of Adelaide, 1972); a condensed version of central arguments 
in this publication, with an explicit focus on Parindra, is presented in Susan Abeyasekere, 
‘Partai Indonesia Raya, 1936–42: A Study in Cooperative Nationalism,’ Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies 3, no. 1 (1972): 262–276.
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(Eurasian) descent. As Jennifer Foray has argued, the Indonesian nsb – a thor-
oughly pro-colonial organization – had little in common with fascism in the 
sense of ‘palingenetic ultra-nationalism,’10 but it was rather geared towards the 
preservation of the colonial status quo.11 Yet, the engagement of Indonesians 
with Fascism and National Socialism as part of their nationalist activism has 
been almost entirely neglected.
Indonesia, however, is not an isolated case. For a long time, fascism has been 
predominantly studied as part of the history of interwar Europe. Stein Ugelvik 
Larsen’s edited volume Fascism Outside Europe marked the beginning of an 
 intensified preoccupation with non-European fascist movements,12 and the 
field of fascist studies became increasingly de-centered as a result of approach-
ing it ‘from the margins.’13 In recent years, the case of the Indian  Hindutva 
movement has garnered much attention, since it provides a prime example of 
a non-European ethnic ultra-nationalism obviously inspired by Italian  Fascism 
and German National Socialism.14 ‘Arab fascism’ and its entanglements with 
fascist regimes in Europe have been subjected to closer scrutiny as well. 
However, the scholarly debates about fascism in the Islamic world serve as a 
 particularly poignant reminder that notions of generic fascism, if taken too far, 
can result in bizarre paradigms such as Islamofascism. The latter term suggests 
an inherent ideological kinship between Islam and fascism, thereby trying to 
explain the former’s alleged receptiveness towards fascist ideas. This argument 
can only be defended by using ahistorical, grossly reductionist and essentialist 
notions of both fascism and Islam.15
10 Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (London: Routledge, 1991), 44.
11 Jennifer L. Foray, ‘An Old Empire in a New Order: The Global Designs of the Dutch 
Nazi Party, 1931–1942,’ European History Quarterly 43, no. 1 (2013): 27–52; see also Tessel 
 Pollmann, ‘Either one is a Fascist or one is not: The Indies’ National-Socialist movement, 
the Imperial Dream, and Mussert’s Colonial Milch Cow,’ transl. by Benedict Anderson, 
Indonesia 92 (October 2011): 43–58.
12 Stein Ugelvik Larsen, ed., Fascism Outside Europe: The European Impulse against Domestic 
Conditions in the Diffusion of Global Fascism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).
13 See Roger Griffin, ‘Decentering Comparative Fascist Studies,’ Fascism: Journal of Compara-
tive Fascist Studies 4 (2015): 103–118, accessed March 22, 2018, doi: 10.1163/22116257-00402003.
14 See among others Ali Raza and Franziska Roy, ‘Paramilitary Organizations in Interwar 
India,’ South Asia 38, no. 4 (2015): 671–689; Maria Framke, Delhi – Rom – Berlin: Die indische 
Wahrnehmung von Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus 1922–1939 (Darmstadt: wbg, 
2013); Benjamin Zachariah, ‘Rethinking (the Absence of) Fascism in India, c. 1922–45’ 
in Cosmopolitan Thought Zones: South Asia and the Global Circulation of Ideas, ed. Sugata 
Bose and Kris Manjapra (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 178–209.
15 For a sober and critical perspective on Islamofascism, see Peter Wien, ‘Arabs and Fascism: 
Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives,’ Die Welt des Islams 52 (2012): 331–350.
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This article sets out to finally make Indonesia part of this ‘global turn’ in 
the field of fascist studies. Looking at Parindra, a so-called ‘cooperating’ 
or ‘cooperative’ nationalist party that emerged as one of the most influen-
tial political  organizations in 1935, I will show how elements of fascist-style 
 mobilization were firmly integrated into the party’s everyday activities. After 
the non- cooperating movement led by Sukarno had been swept away by the 
colonial authorities in 1934, cooperation with the Dutch was the only option 
left to advance the cause of Indonesian nationhood. The distinction between 
‘cooperators’ and ‘non- cooperators,’ which goes back to the colonial period it-
self, should be approached with great care by historians. Above all, ‘coopera-
tion’ meant the acceptance of the Colonial Council, the Volksraad, as the main 
political platform, even though this council had a purely advisory function in 
the colonial administration. Moreover, a party was deemed ‘cooperative’ by the 
colonial state as long as it refrained from making open demands for indepen-
dence (kemerdekaan). However, the example of Parindra, traditionally seen as 
the exemplary cooperating party during the period this article is concerned 
with (1935–1942), serves as a useful reminder to take these colonial categories 
with a grain of salt. As continuous press censorship and tight surveillance cre-
ated an ambiance of frustration, leading Parindrists turned to a rhetoric of 
glory and splendor, became particularly inspired by the example of German 
National Socialism, and tried to forge their youth organization Surya Wirawan 
[Sun of Heroes] into a cadre based on martial values.
Once the Japanese occupied Indonesia in 1942, romantic ideas about a 
society based on military values may have acquired a stale flavor for some 
 nationalists, as their organizations were either banned or absorbed into the 
Japanese military administration.16 However, Japan’s militaristic propaganda 
was, overall, a great success, especially among young Indonesians. It goes with-
out saying that Japan’s intense indoctrination campaigns sparked a passion 
for armed resistance that extended deep into the decolonization war  between 
1945 and 1949, or even beyond. And yet, leading scholars like Benedict An-
derson and Robert Cribb failed to see that paramilitarism was not merely a 
‘child’ of the Japanese occupation. While the arrival of the Japanese marked 
a dramatic break for Indonesian nationalism, it was not as much of a turning 
16 For the most concise and up-to-date overview of the organizations endorsed or estab-
lished by the Japanese, see Robert Cribb, ‘Institutions,’ in The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in 
the Pacific War, ed. Frederick Post et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 102–113; see also Shigeru Sato, 
War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under Japanese Occupation 1942–1945 (St. Leonards: 
Allen & Unwin, 1994).
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point as Anderson suggested in his widely known publication Java in a Time of 
Revolution.17
Robert Cribb’s famous work Gangsters and Revolutionaries is equally oblivi-
ous of the 1930s as Anderson’s account, as his argument jumps from the defeat 
of the communist party pki in 1927 straight to the landing of the Japanese on 
Java in March 1942.18 Even though he recognizes ‘traditions of unrest’ linked to 
Batavia’s (nowadays: Jakarta) urban culture and connects them to nationalism, 
he skips the 1930s for reasons that are not specified any further.19
Therefore, the proposed argument is based on a conscious decision to go 
beyond the conventional narrative of Japan as the major source of ‘fascist 
inspiration’ in Indonesia. If Japan’s relationship with European fascisms can 
be understood as part of a transnational ‘fascist effect,’ as Reto Hofmann has 
convincingly argued, then Indonesia – like any other non-European country – 
deserves a similar degree of scrutiny.20 Japan’s impact on the militarization 
of Indonesian society both before and during the Japanese occupation is well 
established in the literature. On the other hand, the agency of Indonesians in 
this process is still not sufficiently explored. As this article attempts to show, 
Indonesian fascism was more than just a product of Japanese indoctrination.
 A Note on Methodology and Conceptual Debates
This article takes a performative approach to fascism, arguing that ‘doing 
 fascism’ presupposes neither a coherent ideology nor the self-labeling of politi-
cal actors as fascists. If we want to study fascism as an ‘effect,’ approaching its 
history ‘as that of a process, not of a clearly defined model,’21 we have to move 
beyond notions such as ‘transfer’ or ‘transmission’ in the pursuit of a more 
multifocal framework. Therefore, fascism should not be understood as a form 
of ‘contagion.’ As Aristotle Kallis has pointed out, ‘the “contagion metaphor” 
says little about the specific – and very different – reasons behind the diffusion 
or the wildly diverse shape of the political, ideological, and institutional hybrid 
17 Benedict Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944–1946 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), particularly 30–34.
18 Robert Cribb, Gangsters and Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People’s Militia and the Indone-
sian Revolution, 1945–1949 (North Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1991).
19 On Jakarta’s ‘tradition of unrest and rebellion’, see Cribb, Gangsters and Revolutionaries, 
24.
20 Reto Hofmann, The Fascist Effect: Japan and Italy, 1915–1952 (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2015).
21 Hofmann, The Fascist Effect, 3.
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outcomes.’22 Recent studies of non-European fascist movements, chief among 
them Maggie Clinton’s study of fascism in China between 1925 and 1937, have 
made productive attempts to consider fascism both as an effect and a manifes-
tation of larger global trends on a local level.23
Roger Griffin’s more recent theoretical works on fascism as a form of ‘mod-
ernism’ have shifted the focus from ideology and culture to praxis and per-
formance.24 Moreover, the study of fascism as a ‘political religion’, as it was 
tirelessly promoted by Emilio Gentile since the 1990s, has played a major 
role in encouraging a more panoramic view on fascism’s extensive realm of 
symbols, rituals, and (political) myth-making.25 Acknowledging the value of 
these trends, this article zooms in on the militarization of Parindra’s youth 
wing, Surya Wirawan. To this end, my argument draws inspiration from Sven 
Reichardt’s comparative study of the German Storm Troopers and the Italian 
Blackshirts, looking at fascism as a specific form of communal interaction and 
enactment.26
Since Surya Wirawan portrayed itself simultaneously as a scout group and 
the youth wing of a political party, its status as an organization was deliberately 
blurred. While this ‘blurriness’ was typical of Indonesian youth organizations 
throughout the 1930s,27 Surya Wirawan stood out in that it frequently trans-
gressed the border between ‘harmless’ scouting and fascist-inspired paramili-
tarism.28 Therefore, this case study does not only add to our understanding of 
fascism in colonial contexts, but it also contributes to debates about fascism’s 
relationship to youth mobilization and militarization.
22 Aristotle Kallis, ‘The “Fascist Effect”: On the Dynamics of Political Hybridization in 
 Inter-War Europe,’ in Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship in Europe, ed. António Costa 
Pinto and Aristotle Kallis (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 22.
23 Maggie Clinton, Revolutionary Nativism: Fascism and Culture in China, 1925–1937 (Durham, 
nc: Duke University Press, 2017).
24 Roger Griffin, Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and 
 Hitler (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
25 A large number of publications – among them a couple of excellent edited volumes – has 
emerged from this scholarly engagement with Gentile’s conceptual framework. For the 
sake of brevity, I only refer to Emilio Gentile, The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy 
(Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press, 1996).
26 Sven Reichardt, Faschistische Kampfbünde: Gewalt und Gemeinschaft im italienischen 
Squadrismus und in der deutschen sa (Köln: Böhlau, 2002).
27 Pujo Semedi, ‘Padvinders, Pandu, Pramuka: Youth and State in the Twentieth Century 
Indonesia’ [sic], Africa Development 26, no. 3–4 (2011): 19–38.
28 Alessio Ponzio, Shaping the New Man: Youth Training Regimes in Fascist Italy and Nazi 
Germany (Madison, wi: University of Wisconsin Press, 2015); George L. Mosse, The Image 
of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 160.
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 Doomed to Failure? How Fascism Entered Indonesia
In July 1933, news of a recently established fascist party named Partai Fascist 
Indonesia [pfi; Fascist Party of Indonesia] circulated both in the Malay- and 
Dutch-language press. Founded in the city of Bandung by Javanese nobleman 
Notonindito, who had studied economics in the Netherlands and Germany, 
this party’s ambitions revolved around the creation a federation of indepen-
dent Indonesian kingdoms. Indonesian scholar Wilson, the first author to deal 
with the brief history of this very short-lived phenomenon, rightly remarks 
that pfis alleged fascism was nothing but a label. Rather, it was Notonindito’s 
expressed aim to revive ideas that were developed in the 1910s by aristocratic 
Javanese nationalists like Soetatmo Soerjokoesoemo and Noto Soeroto, among 
others.29
While this strand of nationalism represented by Javanese aristocrats un-
doubtedly harbored a deep distrust of democracy and everything supposedly 
‘Western,’ their view of politics hardly qualifies as fascist since it lacks any trace 
of a revolutionary demeanor.30 Therefore, it is not surprising that Notonindito’s 
attempt to breathe new life into this unabashedly elitist vision did not strike 
a chord with revolutionary nationalists. In fact, the criticism directed against 
Notonindito’s project was so fierce that he denied his leading role in this ‘party’ 
(if it ever was one) and quickly disappeared from the political stage within a 
month.31 The Dutch-language press, on the other hand, seemed to be quite 
unimpressed by the emergence of his party.32 Even though the pfi went down 
like a lead balloon as soon as its existence was proclaimed, Wilson argues that 
‘Notonindito made the [nationalist] movement aware that reactionary ideas 
on nationalism had potential among Indonesian circles.’33
In the eyes of many nationalists, the most reactionary element of No-
tonindito’s project must have been his anti-nationalism. Since most of them 
were adamant about proclaiming a united Indonesia in the form of a single 
nation, Notonindito’s plan to restore an imagined status quo ante must have 
appeared truly audacious to them. The role of democracy, however, barely 
29 Wilson, Orang dan Partai Nazi, 119–122.
30 See also Farabi Fakih, ‘Conservative corporatist: Nationalist thoughts of aristocrats: 
The Ideas of Soetatmo Soeriokoesoemo and Noto Soeroto’, Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- 
en Volkenkunde 168, no. 4 (2012): 420–444, accessed March 22, 2018, doi:10.1163/22134379 
-90003551.
31 Wilson, Orang dan Partai Nazi, 123.
32 ‘Fascist Indonesia: Weer wat nieuws,’ De Indische Courant, 22 July 1933; ‘Inheemsche Fas-
cisten: Een gewichtig programma,’ Soerabaiasch Handelsblad, 22 July 1933.
33 Wilson, Orang dan Partai Nazi, 123.
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 occupied  center stage in the critiques articulated against him. Skepticism 
about democracy was widespread among nationalists, and it affected the left 
wing as much as it shaped the conceptions of more conservative, authoritar-
ian political actors.34 Instead, a rather ‘didactic,’ top-down approach to poli-
tics prevailed among the large majority of educated nationalists. Disciplining 
‘the people’ was, therefore, a central matter of concern. Throughout his long 
political career, Soetomo had been a particularly ardent proponent of this di-
dactic approach to nationalism. By introducing the notion of Indonesia Moelia 
[Glorious Indonesia] as an alternative to the more radical Indonesia Merdeka 
[Independent Indonesia], he framed the nationalist cause as a journey of spiri-
tual development and self-assertion. As Soetomo put it:
The use of [Indonesia Moelia] is not for fear of expressing a striving for 
Indonesia Merdeka [independent Indonesia]. On the contrary, it signifies 
an intention to glorify the people materially and spiritually. In our view, 
independence does not guarantee the glory of a people and nation; on 
the other hand, national glory can only result from freedom. Thus, the 
aspiration toward Indonesia Moelia already embraces the concept of In-
donesia Merdeka since it is impossible for a country and nation to be 
glorious if it is not yet free.35
This zeal to ‘glorify the people,’ mixed with an understanding of citizenship 
based on ‘lofty and inescapable duties,’36 explains why Soetomo thought of 
Parindra as an instrument to forge a new political elite capable of defending 
Indonesia’s national interests in the future. He generally promoted the milita-
rization of Indonesian society as a preparation for future hardships.37
While it is safe to say that Soetomo followed news reports on international 
developments with great interest, his fascination for military organization was 
not just a by-product of following the headlines. His travelogue published un-
der the title Poespita Mantja Nagara [Flowers from Abroad], in which he re-
counts his experiences during an extensive journey to Japan, India, the Near 
34 Robert Elson, The Idea of Indonesia (Cambridge, uk: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
52.
35 Soetomo, ‘Kompetisi not kongkurensi,’ in Toward a Glorious Indonesia: Reminiscences and 
Observations of Dr. Soetomo, ed. Paul W. van der Veur (Athens, oh: Ohio University Center 
for International Studies, 1987), 273.
36 Soetomo, ‘Preparing for Combat,’ in Toward a Glorious Indonesia, 251.
37 Harry Poeze, ed., Politiek-Politioneele Overzichten van Nederlandsch-Indië: Bronnenpub-
likatie, Vol. 4, 1935–1941 (Leiden: kitlv Press, 1994), ‘November–December 1935’, 56.
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and Middle East as well as Europe, contains an entire chapter dedicated to an 
encounter with members of the Egyptian Blue Shirts, the paramilitary organi-
zation linked to the nationalist liberal Wafd Party. He opens the chapter stating 
his joy of being able to freely associate ‘with groups on the left as well as the 
right’, remarking that in Indonesia he ‘can’t do this, because the left wing hates 
me and considers me a member of the bourgeoisie while other groups call me 
a dangerous leftist.’38 He describes the Blue Shirts as ‘an alert and clever politi-
cal group whose members are taught military science: marching, combat, and 
airplane flying.’39 While, generally speaking, the role of fascism in the devel-
opment of Egyptian nationalism should not be unduly overstated,40 the Blue 
Shirts were unambiguously modeled on the Italian Blackshirts. In fact, Italians 
living in Egypt were among the first in that country to form a paramilitary or-
ganization directly inspired by the Fascist ‘original.’41
In line with research on fascism’s connection to modernity, I argue that mod-
ernizers like Soetomo could not help being fascinated by fascism’s promise of 
a flawless synthesis between modernity and tradition. This zest for all things 
modern was an essential feature of the Indonesian nationalist  movement that 
can be traced back to its early days in the 1910s.42 Figures like Soetomo were 
grappling with the issue of modernity in a period of great uncertainty in the 
colony. Since Indonesian nationalist discourse in the 1930s was still extremely 
malleable, the lines between mere ultra-nationalism and fascism were blurred 
from the beginning. In a context in which even communists had to be out-
spoken nationalists to succeed, fascism’s combination of staunch nationalism 
and anti-establishment rhetoric was hardly a unique selling point. However, 
fascism lent itself to youth mobilization like no other political program. While 
youth mobilization was not exclusively fascist, its ‘exaltation of youth was 
unique, however, in that it not only made a special appeal to them but also 
38 Soetomo, ‘Poespita Mantja Nagara,’ in Toward a Glorious Indonesia, 180.
39 Soetomo, ‘Poespita Mantja Nagara,’ 182.
40 See Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, Confronting Fascism in Egypt: Dictatorship 
 versus Democracy in the 1930s (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2009).
41 See James P. Jankowski, ‘The Egyptian Blue Shirts and the Egyptian Wafd, 1935–1938,’ 
 Middle Eastern Studies 6 (1970): 77–95.
42 Takashi Shiraishi, An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java 1912–1926 (New York: 
 Cornell University Press, 1990); on the nexus between modernity, nationalism, and 
citizenship see also Henk Schulte Nordholt, ‘Modernity and Cultural Citizenship in the 
Netherlands Indies: An Illustrated Hypothesis,’ Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 42, no. 
3 (2011): 435–457; the centrality of ‘Europeanness’ as a multi-layered cultural ideal is thor-
oughly explored in Bart Luttikhuis, Negotiating Modernity: Europeanness in late colonial 
Indonesia, 1910–1942 (PhD diss., European University Institute, 2014).
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exalted youth over all other generations, without exception, and to a greater 
degree than any other force based itself on generational conflict.’43 Still, it is 
important to add that the idealization of youth was not only central to fascism 
but nationalism in general. Although it is disputable whether youth was a core 
element of European nationalism, anticolonial nationalism glorified youth 
for concrete historical reasons. As Benedict Anderson remarks in Imagined 
Communities:
It is perfectly true that in one sense Europe had been there before – if we 
think of Young Ireland, Young Italy, and the like. But in Europe ‘young’ 
had little in the way of definable sociological contours. One could be 
middle aged and still part of Young Ireland; one could be illiterate and 
still part of Young Italy…. In the colonies things were very different. Youth 
meant, above all, the first generation in any significant numbers to have 
acquired a European education, marking them off linguistically and cul-
turally from their parents’ generation, as well from the vast bulk of their 
colonized agemates.44
The promise of a new beginning as a unified nation with a single language 
(Bahasa Indonesia) that transcends ethnic boundaries was thus seen as inher-
ent to youth. This transformative potential was both an idealization and at 
the same time a manifest social dynamic to be reckoned with. The idea of a 
single Indonesian nation and people was promoted by Indonesian youth orga-
nizations, particularly in the late 1920s. In 1928, the second Indonesian Youth 
 Congress crafted the slogan ‘one motherland, one nation, one language’ and 
adopted ‘Indonesia Raya’ [Great Indonesia] as the national anthem. Ever since, 
the Pemuda [Youth] myth has been a constant companion of Indonesian his-
tory up to this day. Concerning the colonial situation, John Ingleson states that 
the symbols and rituals that took shape in the context of the youth movement 
‘played a vital part in maintaining enthusiasm, especially in times when the 
harsh reality of the colonial political situation threatened to induce despair 
and inertia.’45
After the activities of the openly anticolonial Partai Nasional Indonesia 
(pni), which spearheaded the nationalist movement under the leadership 
of Indonesia’s future president Sukarno, were brought to a screeching halt 
43 Stanley Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914–1945 (London: Routledge, 1995), 13.
44 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
 Nationalism, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1983/2006), 119.
45 Ingleson, Road to Exile, 67.
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by the colonial government in 1934, the spirit of the youth movement was 
dampened, too. From 1934 onwards, only cooperating nationalist movements 
could openly operate in Indonesia, and even then, their scope for action was 
severely curtailed by the Dutch authorities. Parindra and the more left-wing 
Gerindo [ Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia; Indonesian People’s Movement] tried to 
advance the nationalist cause under these hostile conditions, and it is within 
this  context that we have to examine Parindra and its youth organization Surya 
Wirawan as they experimented with new means to keep the idea of Indonesia 
alive during that period.
 Staged Glory: Parindra, Surya Wirawan, and the ‘Fascist Halo’
In October 1936, soon after Parindra was founded, Soetomo called for the 
transformation of Parindra’s scout unit Surya Wirawan into an organization 
modeled on paramilitary groups like the nsb’s Nationale Jeugdstorm [National 
Youth Storm].46 From 1937 onwards, the ‘scouts’ of Surya Wirawan were a 
regular sight at Parindra meetings and conferences, raising their flag,47 sing-
ing the ‘Indonesia Raya’ and even forming honor guards for important Parin-
drists (Figure 1). They quickly became an important part of the party’s public 
 presence and were soon referred to as an important ‘foundation’ for Parindra’s 
 political  activism.48 The colonial police authorities regularly disbanded Surya 
 Wirawan’s public marches and meetings, very much to the party leadership’s 
chagrin. As early as October 1937, the organizational obstacles faced by Surya 
Wirawan became a frequent matter of discussion during party meetings.49 
Consequently, leading Parindrists used the Volksraad as a platform to demand 
a greater range of action for their youth organization in public. For instance, 
in 1939 Soekardjo  Wirjopranoto voiced serious complaints about the way in 
which police  regulations sabotaged the organization’s activities. He made his 
point unmistakably clear, saying that ‘if the police regulations have to be fol-
lowed, this  organization will not be able to survive.’50
46 Soeara Parindra 1, October 1936, 9.
47 The party’s flag was treated like an object of devotion and a ‘banner.’ See R.Z.A. Wantjik, 
‘Rantjangan Lagoe Surya Wirawan,’ Soeara Parindra 3, no. 6 (1938): 238; Soeara Parindra 4, 
no. 2 (1939): 71.
48 Overzicht van de Inlandsche en Maleisch-Chineesche Pers [henceforth: ipo] 41, October 9 
1937, 672.
49 ipo 43, 23 October 1937, 696.
50 Volksraad Handelingen 1939–40, 37ste Vergadering, 22 August 1939, 1124.
 123Staged Glory
fascism 7 (2018) 109-131
<UN>
From 1938 onward, the headquarters of Surya Wirawan officially turned the 
organization into a ‘youth corps’ and set up a separate scout group for young-
sters. From then on, only men aged eighteen or older could join the organi-
zation. The expressed goal was that members of Surya Wirawan should join 
Parindra ‘as soon as possible.’51 In 1939, these instructions were specified fur-
ther: Surya Wirawan was allowed to set up ‘scout’ groups linked to the organi-
zation. However, members below eighteen years of age were not allowed to 
join official political gatherings. Adult members of the political youth corps, on 
the other hand, were obliged to join the party within three years. Hence, Surya 
Wirawan was fully integrated into the party’s recruitment scheme.52
As soon as the prospect of war with Japan could no longer be ignored, the 
colonial government started to arrange preparations and precautions. During 
that process, Surya Wirawan seized opportunities to get access to any form of 
training that was even remotely military in nature. For example, in late 1939, 
members of Batavia’s Surya Wirawan joined a voluntary course on air raid pre-
cautions. For the colonial government, relying on Indonesian volunteers was a 
double-edged sword. While the Dutch authorities were in dire need of ‘native’ 
propagandists and manpower to put their defense plans into action, they were 
at the same time painfully aware that not all volunteers were to be trusted. 
The precariousness of this situation is reflected in the source material, which 
shows that the Dutch were unable to reconcile their need for hands-on sup-
port with their concerns over opportunists who might abuse their positions 
for subversive acts.
51 ipo 42, 15 October 1938, 694.
52 ipo 2, 14 January 1939, 27.
Figure 1 Surya Wirawan division marching through Batavia (nowadays: Jakarta), 1939.
Source: Soeara Parindra 4, no. 7–8 (1939).
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On the one hand, leading personnel in the Luchtbeschermingsdienst [Air Raid 
Precaution Service] praised the support of scout organizations, civilians, and 
the Indonesian Press.53 On the other hand, however, Dutch  authorities  refused 
to give Indonesians access to top-positions on dubious grounds. In 1938, the 
director of the Binnenlandsch Bestuur [the administrative body for domestic 
affairs] contacted the governors of East and Central Java, among  others, to 
enquire about two candidates that had been recommended to him. The Gov-
ernor of Central Java advised the director of the Binnenlandsch Bestuur not 
to appoint a certain Raden Suwarjo Tirtosupono as the chief inspector of the 
Luchtbeschermingsdienst. In the words of the Governor, Tirtosupono’s ‘un-
steady past and his apparently wavering character’ made him an unsuitable 
candidate for this task. However, it seems as if this assessment of his personal-
ity was first and foremost based on his former involvement with left-leaning 
nationalist parties.54
The other Indonesian candidate, who was, like Tirtosupono, a civil servant by 
profession, was declined for the reason that his superior, the Governor of East 
Java, was opposed to a ‘weakening of the administrative staff ’ by letting go of 
this ‘excellent’ employee.55 This civil servant, Raden Rooslan Wongsokoesomo, 
was an influential Parindrist. Yet, the document does not make any references 
to Wongsokoesomo’s political affiliations. Rooslan Wongsokoesomo was said to 
have valuable organizational skills and prior experience with air raid precau-
tions. His work as assistant-wedana (a member of the regional  administrative 
bureaucracy) and his role as the secretary of Parindra’s central administration 
explain why he was considered to be a gifted organizer. His prior experience 
with recruiting volunteers for air raid precaution measures, however, derived 
from his position as the head of Surya Wirawan’s central organization. From 
that viewpoint, he must have been an ideal candidate thanks to his expertise 
and his networks. Nevertheless, he was not hired for the position.
This situation is characteristic of the friction between pragmatic consider-
ations and fears of a loss of control that dominated Dutch thinking in the pre-
war period. In this uneasy atmosphere, parts of the public and the colonial 
administration slowly came to the conviction that Surya Wirawan was not an 
organization to be trusted. The organization’s public appearance, for exam-
ple, aroused suspicions. Admonishments by government authorities  ensued 
53 Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia [henceforth: anri], Arsip bb 3939, Hoofdinspecteur 
M.H. du Croo aan Resident te Batavia, 25 Februari 1938; anri, Arsip bb, 3886, Nota aan 
Directeur van bb; anri, Arsip bb 3960, Directeur bb aan Governeur van Oost-Java.
54 anri, Arsip bb, 3886, Governeur van Centraal Java aan Directeur bb, 23 July 1938.
55 anri, Arsip bb 3886, Governeur van Oost-Java aan Directeur bb, 23 May 1938.
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 because ‘Wirawans,’ as the members of Surya Wirawan were often called, 
regularly showed up in uniform. When some of the organization’s members 
applied for military training under a knil [Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch 
Leger; Royal Netherlands East Indies Army] officer, they were forbidden to 
wear their uniforms in advance of the event. This caused great indignation in 
Parindra circles since it was argued that the uniform was an essential part of 
Surya Wirawan’s self-conception.56 Moreover, this issue was problematic since 
the ban on wearing uniforms for volunteer work did apparently not apply for 
every party. As a consequence, Parindrists like Thamrin were indignant at this 
application of double standards.57
While these loudly voiced complaints were obviously more symptomatic 
of late colonial Indonesia’s hyped-up news coverage, this is the right point to 
tell the story of a man who referred to his uniform while delivering a telltale 
anecdote. During a Parindra conference in Cirebon (North Java), a Parindrist 
named Soedarjo Tjokrosisworo gave a talk about the role of Surya Wirawan. 
He used this opportunity to point to his new white uniform, which, accord-
ing to reactions from his fellow party members, made him look very similar to 
56 ipo 39, 30 September 1939, 689.
57 See for example ‘Luchtbeschermers zijn niet laks: Maar het publiek is veel te onverschil-
lig,’ Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, 28 February 1940.
Figure 2 Second party congress of Partai Indonesia Raya, Bandung, 1939.
Source: Soeara Parindra 4, no. 1 (1939).
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Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano. He then claimed to have answered as 
follows: ‘That is perfectly possible. Once Indonesia has a parliament, I will be 
Count Ciano.’58 As a consequence, the conference was disbanded by the police.
Tjokrosisworo was not a fringe figure, but an important voice in Parindra 
 circles. Moreover, as the vice-chairman of the Indonesian journalists’ as-
sociation Perdi [Persatuan Djurnalis Indonesia; Association of Indonesian 
 Journalists], he was an influential public figure. In an article he wrote for the 
pro-Parindrist newspaper Soeara Oemoem, he criticizes fellow nationalists for 
their lack of ‘strength of character,’ urging them to get inspired by Western men 
of ‘great character’ such as Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, Aristide Briand, Hitler, 
and Mussolini. He complained about the unwillingness of his compatriots to 
absorb what he considered to be useful Western values and approaches,  stating 
that the movement suffered from a lack of real nationalist thinkers. Quoting 
from one Soetomo’s letters, he went on to say that Indonesians still lived in a 
‘period of sacrifice’ which, however, would soon draw to an end. His conclusion 
was, therefore, optimistic, and he ended it by underpinning his appeal to his 
countrymen with a sentence taken from Baltus Wigersma’s Het Wezen van het 
Fascisme (The Nature of Fascism): ‘There is no people corrupt enough to be to-
tally devoid of national feelings.’59 Wigersma was a Dutch fascist theoretician 
who joined the nsb in the 1930s,60 and ending an article with such a quote was 
anything but usual in the Indonesian nationalist press.
Tjokrosisworo’s political activism was not confined to writing. As Surya 
 Wirawan’s Daerah Commissaris [Regional Commissioner] for Central Java, he 
coordinated activities in one of the most politically active regions of Indonesia. 
Moreover, he was a member of Parindra’s ‘Press and Propaganda Department’ 
and gave talks about topics such as ‘tactics for the political struggle.’61 Accord-
ing to him, ‘those who have the capacity to think (thinkers), should  ideally only 
generate ideas and provide direction as well as leadership. Those who have the 
capacity to inspire others (propagandists) should only disseminate that which 
has already been created by the thinkers. And those who have the capacity to 
realize something (executors) are only limited by their abilities.’62
The most striking feature about Parindra was that its youth organization 
used the Nazi salute during its meetings. Photos published in the party journal 
58 ipo 8, 24 February 1940, 131.
59 ipo 3, 16 January 1937, 38–40.
60 The book mentioned is Baltus Wigersma, Het Wezen van het Fascisme (Bussum: Van 
Dishoeck, 1934).
61 Soeara Parindra 4, no. 7–8 (1939).
62 ‘Banjak bitjara, banjak bekerdja: Politiek dan sociaal-economisch arbeid,’ Soeara Parindra 
6, no. 5 (1941).
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Soeara Parindra show that members of Surya Wirawan used this unmistak-
able salute with great confidence as early as 1937,63 and leading Parindrists 
were hardly unaware of the fact that the ‘groot saluut’ [great salute], or ‘saluut 
 terhormat’ [most honorable salute], was used on a regular basis.64 Unfortu-
nately, the sources do not indicate when this practice was adopted, but the 
 visual  material which is available shows that this salute was used from the up-
per  echelons of the party to the youths of Surya Wirawan (Figure 2).  
When Thamrin, the party’s most vociferous and savvy spokesman, died in 
1941, his funeral was staged as a display of unswerving unity.65 In Susan Abey-
asekere’s words, ‘Thamrin’s death overshadowed the details of Government 
charges against him. At a time when the nationalists were embittered by Gov-
ernment neglect and intransigence, Thamrin [who died when under forced 
house arrest] became a martyr.’66 She then goes on to quote a Dutch observer, 
who describes Thamrin’s funeral as a ‘great mass manifestation of Indonesian 
nationalism, which – without any  anti-Dutch words being spoken – bore a 
clearly anti-Dutch character.’67 Through his tragic death, Thamrin truly be-
came a martyr for Parindra’s cause. In his memoirs, Jan Anne Jonkmann, presi-
dent of the Volksraad from 1939 until 1942, recalls that ‘Thamrin was buried like 
a prince. The interest and sympathy of the Indonesians were overwhelming.’68
A photo taken during this public ceremony shows the party’s leader-
ship, headed by Soekardjo Wirjopranoto, marching through ranks of Surya 
Wirawan members performing the Nazi salute (Figure 3). Moreover, a collec-
tion of newspaper material published shortly after Thamrin’s funeral provides 
evidence that the salute was used by ‘Wirawans’ and prominent Parindrists 
alike.69 Two years earlier, during the party’s second congress in 1939, the same 
public ritual was performed, and it was equally impossible for it to go unno-
ticed by the Dutch authorities since the list of honorable guests included the 
Assistant- Resident of Bandung, the latter city’s mayor, and – most strikingly – 
the  Adviseur voor  Inlandsche Zaken [the Governor-General’s advisor for ‘native’ 
affairs] G.F.   Pijper.70 Pijper’s report to the Governor-General, however, pays 
no  attention to this  ceremony, even though Thamrin used the congress as a 
63 Soeara Parindra 2, no. 11 (1937): 179.
64 Soeara Parindra 4, no. 7–8 (1939): 227.
65 ‘De Begrafenis van Thamrin,’ [Thamrin’s funeral] De Indische Courant, 13 January 1941.
66 Susan Abeyasekere, One Hand Clapping: Indonesian Nationalists and the Dutch 1939–1942 
(Clayton, Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1976), 79.
67 Jacques de Kadt, De Indonesische Tragedie (Amsterdam: Van Oorschot, 1949), 60.
68 Jan Anne Jonkman, Het Oude Nederlands-Indië (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1971), 214.
69 See Imam Soepardi, ed., Kenang-Kenangan M.H. Thamrin (Surabaya: Pustaka Nasional, 
1941), 20, 29 and 37.
70 ‘Congres Parindra Ke ii,’ Soeara Parindra 4, no. 1 (1939): 3.
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platform to promote militaristic values under the premise of national defense 
against Japan.71
While complaints about the use of the Nazi salute were voiced in the Dutch-
language press in reaction to the aforementioned congress,72 it was only 
 abolished in 1941, several months after Thamrin’s funeral.73 This happened as 
a reaction to the government banning the Nazi salute, and while Parindrists 
publicly admitted that they were aware of this practice being dubious, they 
professed they ‘did not adopt it out of a particular sympathy for Hitler and 
his Nazis.’74 However, this ban only applied to public meetings involving 
non-members. Therefore the abolition of the salute was rather a lip service to 
ward off unwanted interventions by the colonial authorities.75
71 anri, ar D 63a, Verslag van het tweede partijcongres van Parindra, February 10, 1939.
72 ‘De Parindra is democratisch: Haar Jeugorganisatie gebruikt echter een weerzinwekkende 
groet,’ [Parindra is democratic: However, its youth organization uses a repulsive salute] 
Het Volksdagblad, 29 March 1939.
73 ‘Parindra en Hitler,’ De Sumatra Post, 29 July 1941.
74 ipo 23, 7 June 1941, 855.
75 ipo 27, 5 July 1941, 983.
Figure 3 Surya Wirawan performing the ‘great salute’ during Thamrin’s funeral, Jakarta, 
January 12, 1941.
Source: Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and 
 Caribbean Studies (kitlv), Photo archive, 33357.
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Why would the leadership of a cooperating nationalist party allow or even en-
courage their youth organization to show an affinity for fascism? I argue that 
the propaganda and public appearances of Parindra and Surya Wirawan were 
performances of what I would like to call ‘staged glory.’ It was an erratic  strategy 
to reconcile Parindra’s claim to be a party that fought for ‘unity of basic prin-
ciples, unity of will and thought, and [supported] interests central to the life 
of the nation’76 with the frustrating reality of day-to-day politics in the colony. 
While Parindra was without a doubt the most influential cooperating party, it 
neither had the mass support to back up its demands nor the scope of action 
for concrete political decision-making.77 Since the party’s representatives had 
chosen to operate within the narrow confines imposed by colonial rule, it was 
hard for them to shake off their image of being an ‘elitist’ party. Indeed, aris-
tocrats and Indonesians with academic training were overrepresented in the 
party higher ranks.78
When the Japanese army landed on Java in May 1942, many Parindrists 
thought that the day of Indonesia’s liberation from colonial rule had finally 
come. Parindra – now primarily under the leadership of former Volksraad-
member Samsoedin – played an instrumental role in preparing the ground 
for the Japanese military administration. Surya Wirawan was renamed into 
 Barisan Pemuda Asia Raya [Greater Asia Youth Corps] and trained to serve 
Japanese interests. However, Parindra’s hopes were bitterly disappointed: As 
dissatisfaction with the former colonial cooperators grew among other par-
ties and friction was inevitable, Japanese military authorities brushed the 
movement away, thus setting an abrupt end to Parindra’s dominance. Instead, 
they decided for Sukarno and Hatta, the exiled leaders of the non-cooperating 
movement, to be their new collaborators of choice.79 Despite this frustrating 
turn of events, Parindra’s leadership did not lose hope that ‘their’ youth would 
serve as an example for an independent Indonesia in the future. When the par-
ty’s leadership finally announced Parindra’s dissolution in February 1943 under 
great pressure from the Japanese, it ended this ‘farewell letter’ with the words:
We call upon our youth, the former Surya Wirawan members, to always 
keep supporting our leaders [the Japanese]. In these times, the YOUTH 
will determine the history of our country. It is the duty of the young 
 generation to realize the ideals of Dr. Soetomo, namely, a glorious Indone-
sia. With the good opportunity that has been given to us by the  Japanese 
76 Soehoenan Harahap, Parindra dan Masyarakat (Surabaya: Poestaka Nasional, 1939), 9.
77 Abeyasekere, Relations, 128.
78 Ibid., 129.
79 A concise overview is provided in Sato, War, Nationalism and Peasants, 36–53.
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Government and an ongoing sense of enthusiasm as our guideline, we 
believe that our youth will not disappoint the hopes of the people.80
When Parindra declared its farewell, Surya Wirawan was absorbed into a 
new, more militaristic apparatus. Parindra’s party-cadre, which started out 
as an  experiment with youth mobilization and fascist-style organization, 
had  originally been created to fight for a ‘glorious Indonesia.’ As these hopes 
were shattered, all that remained was a semi-militarized youth organization, 
ready to be put to the service of the Japanese military administration. Surya 
 Wirawan, which had been created by Parindra to prepare youth for the day 
of independence and  national self-assertion, became the instrument of yet 
 another foreign oppressor.
 Conclusion
In Soetomo’s opening speech that he gave during the first Parindra Congress 
in May 1937, he defined the party as ‘a catalyst, or a booster that will accelerate 
the development and progress of the nation.’81 This is the typical tone of the 
modernizer. Shortly after, however, he evoked a sense of cultural essentialism 
when he described the party’s main aim as ensuring the ‘optimal realization 
of [the nation’s] own character and spirit.’82 As described above, Soetomo was 
constantly oscillating between these two opposites, for he was an avid mod-
ernizer and a staunch traditionalist.
This paradox is something Soetomo shared with many fascist ideologues 
and sympathizers all over the globe. On the one hand, he envisioned the cre-
ation of a society as perfectly and expertly orchestrated as a Javanese Gamelan 
 orchestra. On the other hand, he felt that handling political matters with 
kid gloves was anathema to social change. In short: Soetomo was longing 
for  iconoclasm, but he wanted the sociocultural edifice of (invented) Indo-
nesian tradition to emerge from this destructive process unscathed, or even 
reinvigorated.
Surya Wirawan was called into life as an organization designed to render 
this ambition visible in the public sphere and to create an aura of dynamism 
and power to compensate for Parindra’s lack of real political power. In that 
80 ‘Afscheidswoord van het Hoofdbestuur van de Parindra’, introd. by Bob Hering, Kabar 
 Seberang 23 (1992), 68.
81 ‘Pidato Ketoea Dr. Soetomo dalam openbare receptie pemboekaan congress Parindra 
ke-1,’ Soeara Parindra 2, no. 5 (1937): 10.
82 Ibid.
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sense, Indonesian fascism – like fascism anywhere else – was a symptom of 
nationalism in crisis. Since the Dutch authorities had effectively banned any 
expression of open defiance, Parindra explored the ‘fascist repertoire’ as a 
more subversive strategy.83 For this end, they did not only engage with the fas-
cist-inspired ideas developed in imperial Japan – they drew ideas and parts of 
their symbolism and aesthetics from European fascism, too. The history of this 
interaction deserves further scrutiny.
83 On the notion of the ‘fascist repertoire’, see Benjamin Zachariah, ‘A Voluntary Gleich-
schaltung? Perspectives from India towards a non-Eurocentric Understanding of Fas-
cism,’ Transcultural Studies 2 (2014), 67.
